We assess the impact of the opium trade on the economies of colonial Malaya, Netherlands Indies, and China from 1873 to 1911 using a new database of stock and commodity prices, plus measures of government revenues, commodity exports, and immigration. Stock returns for a few Malayan industries related to international trade are significantly correlated with opium price changes, as are prices for labour-intensive, Chinese-dominated export commodities such as tin and gambier.
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Introduction
The nature and impact of colonialism continues to be important to understanding the history, politics, and economics of Asia. The economic and political institutions and conditions that evolved under colonial rule continue to colour the workings of today's modern Asian states.
One of the most peculiar and interesting aspects of colonialism in Asia was the opium trade. Opium was already an important commodity in Asia when Europeans first visited Southeast Asian and Chinese ports. Europeans started to ship opium to the Far East to compete for the considerable profits associated with the trade and to barter for the silks, teas, and spices which originally motivated their travels to Asia. As the European presence in Asia evolved into extensive colonial possessions, the import of Turkish and Indian opium became a major economic activity. At points in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, opium tax revenues comprised much, if not most, of colonial government budgets in Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, and French Indochina.
The significance of the opium trade continues to be debated. Therefore, the purpose of our paper is to offer some empirical evidence on the importance of opium to colonial-era Asia. We organise our work around two alternative hypotheses. If the desire to profit from selling opium was the primary reason for colonialism in Southeast Asia and China, changes in the health of the opium trade would have a significant impact on the general economic health of the colonial economies. Therefore, our first hypothesis is that opium was a principal driving force in the colonial economies. Alternatively, the management and taxation of the opium business was merely one of many aspects of administering the Asian colonies, just as modern governments are involved in regulating and taxing tobacco, alcohol, and gambling. The opium trade would react to, rather than cause, the broader economic factors that drove the demand for opium. Therefore, our second hypothesis is that the opium trade merely reflected and followed more fundamental economic conditions. Our two competing hypotheses have a number of distinct implications that we detail below.
We base our tests on a unique database of stock and commodity prices which spans the period from 1873 to 1911 when legal, unregulated opium dealing ceased. From Singapore's principal business newspaper, The Straits Times, we have collected monthly market-determined prices for tin, rubber, pepper, other local commodities, and, most importantly, for opium itself.
This newspaper and others also supply monthly stock prices from Malaya, Netherlands East Indies, and European-administered areas of China. Among our sample are companies that shipped the opium, transported the largely Chinese workers who consumed it, financed the opium traders, and harvested, processed, and transported mineral and agricultural commodities produced by opium-using workers. We also collected annual data on movements of Chinese migrant workers to Southeast Asia, colonial government tax revenues, and commodity production in Malaya.
Collectively, this data allow us to measure the effect of opium on many dimensions of colonial economic activity with considerable precision.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly sketches the historical setting.
Section 3 presents our testable hypotheses. Section 4 outlines the data set and empirical tests we conduct. Section 5 presents results while Section 6 is a summary and discussion of implications.
Historical Overview
India and Opium: Export Commodity to the East
The opium trade developed rapidly given the desire of European merchants to exchange opium for highly prized Far Eastern products. Before British domination of the opium trade, small-scale Portuguese and Dutch traders were regularly shipping opium to Macau, Canton, Java, and the spice islands.
1 With the extension of British influence in Asia, the East India Company (EIC) sought to control cultivation and sale of the drug by constructing authority and power over crucial parts of India. Starting with the Bengal Monopoly in 1773, the company gradually consolidated control and, in 1797, prohibited opium cultivation in their territories except under license. In this way, the EIC controlled opium production while leaving exportation to private traders and agency houses that purchased opium at EIC auctions in Calcutta.
To maintain high opium prices, the company continued with the steady neutralization, through treaties and combat, of rival opium-producing Native Indian states. By the time the EIC lost monopoly privileges in 1833 and the Crown claimed India, opium production had been organised into a reliable system of revenue and provided a steady trade between India and much of eastern Asia. The 1843 annexation of the Sindh, a major smuggling route, effectively sealed British control over opium cultivation and sale. Native cultivation of opium in China began in the 1 See Ananta C. Sahu, Some Aspects of British Trade Policy in India (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House,1985) , David Edward Owen, British Opium Policy in China and India (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934) , and Carl A. Trocki, Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800 -1910 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990 for detailed descriptions of the origins of the opium trade.
late 1860s and offered strong competition to Indian opium in the 1870s and 1880s. The growing threat of local cultivation was a significant factor in negotiations with British India to slow and eventually stop the India-China opium trade. The legal flow of Indian opium to China was administratively curtailed starting in 1911 and ceased entirely in 1917.
Southeast Asia's role in the opium business increased continually with the trade between India and China. For years, the Malay archipelago had served as an important secondary market, absorbing Indian opium and supporting its price when the Chinese opium market was depressed.
2 Southeast Asia developed rapidly as an important part of the colonial economic system of independent traders and agency houses facilitating the India-China trade. Indeed, the British established the port of Singapore in 1819 specifically in the interests of these colonial enterprises.
Historians have argued that, as British colonialism matured, it was shaped mostly by local and regional interests in colonial Asia, not by British officials in the metropole. 3 In 1868, the Colonial
Office took control of the Straits Settlements. 4 Informal British control was placed over Perak, Selangor and Sungei Ujong after 1870, leading ultimately to British authority throughout Malaya.
An underlying cause for the British expansion was turbulent local politics. Power struggles within the Malayan ruling classes and feuding between Chinese secret societies were major disturbances in the peninsula and hindered the production of tin at a time (1866-1872) when world tin prices were rising rapidly. Prominent tin capitalists reached out for assistance and were even willing to appeal to non-British powers for help in stabilizing the situation. Wary of losing their foothold in Southeast Asia, the British intervened.
Opium and Southeast Asia's Economy
Colonial Southeast Asia's export-led growth was largely funneled through the free-trade entrepôt of Singapore, which featured open, legal trading of opium at market-determined prices.
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Opium was a part of the system of commodity production and exportation that evolved rapidly in 1923 -1938 ", Journal of Political Economy 103, 2 (1995 : 261-279, writing about a later period in the Dutch East Indies, asserts that " [t] he share of the Chinese in the population of opium users averaged 47 per cent, whereas their share in total population was 2 per cent in 1930. Furthermore, Chinese opium users used more opium than their indigenous companions...the amount consumed by the Chinese was more than three times as high." 9 Rush Opium to Java and Trocki Opium and Empire describe the operation of the 'opium farm' system in, respectively, Java and Singapore. The 'opium farm' consisted of monopoly rights for the preparation, distribution and sale of retail opium to certain concession areas within colonies. Control of the opium farm usually meant significant control over other avenues of trade. Successful bidders for the 'opium farm' were usually the more politically connected, wealthy, and powerful members of society. In Java and Singapore, Chinese businessmen generally controlled the farm; European bidders were rare and tended to front for rival Chinese groups.
commodities like tin, pepper, and gambier. 10 The largely Chinese workers producing these commodities were regular consumers of opium. In Opium and Empire, Trocki notes that opium was thought to have an energizing effect on miners and plantation labourers, relieving work-related aches and allowing longer and more productive work. 11 Opium was also influential beyond the mines and plantations. However, scholars disagree about the general economic impact of the drug.
In Opium to Java, Rush draws a picture of constant but low usage in the Netherlands East Indies, where hard-core addiction was the exception and the economic impact of opium was not substantial. In his view, opium served merely as an indicator of economic prosperity, not as a significant causal factor. "Opium sales fluctuated with the yearly peasant and plantation agricultural cycles and with general rises and falls in economic prosperity over the years." British public servants overseeing the Empire's trade seemed to share this view. In contrast, Trocki in
Opium and Empire asserts that opium addiction was widespread in the Straits Settlements, affected craftsmen and common workers in addition to immigrants, and had a significant, if not leading, impact on all locally produced commodities. In Government of the Pacific Dependencies, 12 Wilfred Hinton observed that average spending on opium seemed extremely high in relation to daily wages. He saw a positive correlation between the physical labour intensity of a job and the degree of opium consumption. He attributes the arduous labour of coal handlers on the docks-"carrying coal in baskets up a gangway...dumping it into the gaping bunkers, and back again to the beginning of the apparently endless round"-as a major reason why "six out of ten" such labourers became regular opium consumers. Hinton also mentions the common rickshaw operator, who, for example, "will earn $1.00 to $1.50 13 a day in good times, and will very likely spend fifty to sixty cents of it a day on opium, for the chances are about four in ten that he will smoke." The implication is that, if not for opium, the industriousness of workers would have been 10 A plant used to produce medicines, dyes, and tanning chemicals. 11 For instance, Trocki in Opium and Empire, p. 67, writes that "[c]ontemporary reports tell of labourers taking a break for a pipe of opium and then resuming their work 'refreshed.' Gambier planters not only had to clear jungle and brush for their plantations, but they also had to cut wood for the fires to boil the gambier. Mining coolies faced even more demanding exertions...While not in any sense a cure, opium was a palliative that at least relieved the symptoms of these afflictions. It dulled muscular aches and pains, lowered fevers, stopped inflammations, stopped up bowels, and allowed the mind to forget, for a time, the grinding loneliness and desperation of their lives. In these circumstances, opium may well have been considered a necessity" (p. 67 Empire, Trocki claims that lending terms in the colonial period frequently included a share of the profits from worker consumption of opium. In Malaya, planters and workers often worked in remote areas, and basic necessities were usually provided by an on-site company store.
Employees purchased general supplies, including liquor and opium, from the company itself. Due to this captive market, markups of up to three hundred per cent between the market price of raw opium and retail chandu 14 were not unknown. The degree of consumption was evidently so reliable that investors considered a share in opium income as dependable security against their investment. If, for example, the commodity market for pepper declined, the well being of investors would still be assured.
Relation of Opium to Government and Business in Colonial Southeast Asia
There are many references to the importance of opium revenues to colonial coffers. At the administrative level, the purchase tax on opium was an important, if not dominant, form of revenue for colonial governments. Chiang, Hinton, and Trocki note the dependence of the Straits Settlements government on opium-related income. In some years, opium revenue comprised over sixty per cent of Straits government revenues. For the period under study, it was a rare year when opium did not total at least forty per cent of Straits revenue. In The Development of Capitalism in Colonial Indochina, Murray discusses the massive income generated by the French colonial government's opium monopoly in Indochina, where the drug was priced to appeal to everyone from the "rickshaw man and errand boy" to more wealthy consumers. Even before the imposition of government monopoly in 1883, opium had become the largest source of colonial revenue.
Furthermore, opium revenues in Indochina doubled between 1894 and 1907, and continued to grow until as late as the 1930s. Rush in Opium to Java writes of how the drug "underwrote a significant portion of Holland's colonial enterprise." He shares a stunning revelation: Of the years 1876 to 1915, "when the colonial accounts ran into deficits totaling f 295.3 million, the opium dollar during the period we study. 14 In Opium to Java, Rush describes chandu as purified raw opium mixed with taste enhancers and adulterants. The product came in a variety of sizes, depending on the locale. In the Straits Settlements, for instance, chandu was sold by the tahil (about 1.3 ounces), chi (one-tenth of a tahil), or hoon (one-tenth of a chi). In Indochina opium was sold in tins of five, ten, twenty-five, fifty, or one hundred grams.
revenues amounted to f 703.3 million, in the absence of which, the total deficit would have been f 998.6 million. 15 Thus opium reduced the potential deficit by 70 per cent." 16 In the European colonies of Asia, opium seemed to be a powerful economic and social force that shaped the growth and control of the European colonial empires.
For the economy as a whole, however, the picture is not as clear. While opium was certainly important for Chinese businesses, which were almost always the operators of opium and related 'farms,' its effect on European or more export-oriented businesses remains undetermined.
Chiang describes their role as 'complementary' to the more locally based Chinese companies, and concludes that there was a general lack of competition between European and Chinese businesses.
In Planters and Speculators, 17 James Jackson also notes the lack of success encountered by Europeans in their bids for entry into the world of commodity production and opium farming. The end result was that certain sectors, notably gambier and pepper planting, were ceded to Chinese firms, while other sectors, like shipping and plantation finance, were controlled by Westerners.
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Nevertheless, these and other historians assume that opium's influence can be generalized to the whole economy, to European and Chinese firms alike, and to firms in various import and export industries. However, ethnic specialization could imply that opium was not so influential. Rather, it may well be that its effect was strong in certain local sectors, but insignificant in others.
Therefore, the interests of certain business sectors may have overlapped with those of the government, while those of other sectors did not.
Our data begin after the separation of the Straits Settlements from control by the Colonial 
Principal Export Commodities
In this subsection, we briefly describe several of the export commodities that are an important part of our tests. We stress which commodities were most important and profitable during the period we study, were especially labour intensive, and were dominated by Chinese labour or management.
Tin was the most important commodity in east-west trade during most of our period of study. Unlike immigrant Chinese labourers, Indian workers were not known for opium consumption.
Gambier 24 increased then declined in importance during the period under study. Jackson (1968) observes that the 1880s and 1890s were a period of rapidly escalating demand for gambier from Britain and North America, the main destinations for this product. Chinese planters largely controlled the gambier industry. Europeans did not succeed in gambier because they could not compete against the Chinese, who not only paid lower wages but also made significant side profits from the sale of opium and food to their employees. 25 However, gambier was not usually a profitable plant; its price was seldom high enough to justify its cultivation alone. 26 Rather, gambier was often planted in close association with pepper. Gambier cultivation was a labourintensive endeavor, requiring almost continuous collection of the gambier foliage, clearing of jungle and bush, and plenty of available cut wood for the fires in which to boil the commodity.
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This proved to be greatly complementary to the highly seasonal nature of pepper production.
Gambier was a way to ensure constant employment throughout the year for the labour force.
28
Chinese gambier workers, like those in other highly labour-intensive industries, were prone to regular use of opium. Jackson in "Chinese Agricultural Pioneering" writes that, in some years, gambier production would have incurred substantial losses if not for revenue from opium consumption. He notes that gambier exports declined by over forty per cent between 1890 and 1910. Furthermore, Trocki in Opium and Empire suggests that the link between gambier and the opium trade weakened after 1870. By the end of World War I, the gambier industry had ceased to be a significant part of Southeast Asian commodity trade.
Pepper was a staple item of the East-West trade. As noted above, it was often associated with gambier by Chinese planters. Copra, the dried kernel of coconuts, came into prominence as an export article around 1870. The popularity of coconut oil and nut oils in margarine ensured the future of this industry, providing steady if unspectacular returns. 29 In addition, around the turn of the century, government policy in both the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States required the inter-planting of 'permanent' crops, specifically coconut and rubber, for all land grants for gambier and pepper cultivation. 30 It was felt that the introduction of 'permanent' crops would help sustain the fertility of the land, and perhaps shift producer interest from the more-destructive, short-term cultivation of pepper, gambier and tapioca towards longer-term investments. This policy was targeted mainly at
Chinese planters, who were the main gambier and pepper producers. It proved fortuitous, as rubber and copra became more lucrative and product markets expanded. For our period, the copra workforce was likely mostly Chinese. As time progressed, this probably changed to include great numbers of Indian labourers on European-owned plantations.
Tapioca 31 was the last of the great plantation crops in Malaya prior to the rubber boom of the early twentieth century. Its heyday was in the second half of the nineteenth century. Chinese planters and workers dominated this industry. Tapioca cultivation proved quite destructive, exhausting the land much faster than other crops, like pepper or gambier. 32 Official opinion began to turn against the cultivation of tapioca in the 1890s. Officials first tried to regulate tapioca cultivation in order to allow maximum land regeneration. Eventually, tapioca land grants also required the simultaneous cultivation of permanent crops, like rubber or coconuts. The decline of the tapioca industry was quickened in the early 1900s by a drastic fall in prices. 
Testable Hypotheses
Given our understanding of the opium trade and the viewpoints expressed by several prominent writers, we state two alternative hypotheses about the importance of the opium trade to the colonial economies. Each hypothesis leads to distinct predictions about the associations between opium price movements and a variety of indicators of stock market performance, commodity prices and production, and movements of Chinese workers in and out of the region.
Our first hypothesis is inspired by Carl Trocki's Opium and Empire. 33 It characterizes the central role of opium in the colonial Asian economies:
H1: Changes in the price of opium had a direct impact on the profitability of colonial Asian businesses, the amount of revenue collected by colonial governments, and the general level of prosperity in the colonies.
If demand for opium was inelastic, 34 increased opium prices would imply a higher total opium revenue from which shippers, merchants, and financiers associated with the trade would have benefited. Prices for shares in these companies would be positively correlated with opium prices.
Colonial government revenues would be positively correlated with opium prices.
H1 also implies that higher opium prices could have an adverse impact on the cost of production in labour-intensive industries. A higher cost of living (the price of opium) increases the wage demands of mining and agricultural workers (or decreases the supply of immigrant workers from China), and raises the cost of producing commodities. Higher production costs raise price, lower quantity produced, and decrease corporate profits. Therefore, prices for shares of companies that produce and process commodities should be negatively correlated with opium prices, as should the output of those commodities. Prices of commodities should be positively correlated with opium prices. Movements of immigrant workers into export commodity businesses would be negatively correlated with opium prices. Under H1, opium should have no impact on 33 Note, however, that Trocki describes the size, volatility, and impact of the opium trade as largest during periods prior to the start of our data set in 1873. 34 This is a strong assumption. See van Ours "The Price Elasticity of Hard Drugs" for some supportive statistical evidence. On the other hand, there is also conflicting historical and anecdotal evidence suggesting that the quantity of opium consumed was quite sensitive to the price of the drug.
rubber-related indicators, since the rubber workforce consisted mainly of immigrant Indians. 35 To the extent that wage demands and other costs adjust only gradually to the increased cost of opium, opium prices may lead prices for export commodities.
Our alternative hypothesis is inspired by James Rush's Opium to Java. It suggests that the health of the opium trade was derived from, or indicative of, more fundamental economic conditions:
H2: Changes in the price of opium were caused by shifts in demand driven by more fundamental economic factors.
When commodity exports and other aspects of the colonial economy were booming, wages were 35 Rubber data proved difficult to gather. Rubber company share prices are only observable during the last half dozen years of our sample period. Rubber price data was impossible to collect consistently as rubber auctions occurred only irregularly in Singapore and Penang during our sample period.
Some of the predictions differ markedly under H1 versus H2. When combined with our empirical results, these differences may allow us to distinguish between the two hypotheses.
Data and Methodology
Our sample spans the period from December 1872 to June 1911. Prior to 1872, stock and commodity prices appeared in The Straits Times and other newspapers only sporadically. After
June 1911, regional governments regulated the supply of opium and did not allow its price to fluctuate freely.
Opium prices
We collected end-of-month prices in Straits dollars per "export" 36 opium chest (containing forty raw opium balls each weighing about 1.5 kilograms) from The Straits Times. Our price quotes represent the most regularly reported Benares opium.
The Singapore export opium price is particularly important for several reasons. Its regularity as a data source and its free-market nature make it possibly the best available indicator of opium demand, relatively free of local idiosyncrasies, for the Asian region. 37 "The forces that generally determined the opium price were outside of Southeast Asia," Trocki writes in Opium and Empire. "As the centre of the trade in Southeast Asia, however, Singapore became the transmitter of global economic forces." Therefore, export opium prices from Singapore are a relatively undistorted measure of global demand and supply. They had substantial impact on more controlled markets. Rush in Opium to Java and Van Ours in "The Price Elasticity of Hard Drugs", for instance, credit the free trade in Singapore for driving down governmentally negotiated 'opium farm' prices in Java. 38 By some estimates, the amount of smuggled opium substantially overwhelmed that of legal opium. One author 39 thought smuggled opium accounted for up to sixty per cent of the available opium in Java. Therefore, the free market opium price from Singapore is 36 Sales of opium within Singapore were controlled by the licensed opium "farmer" or later by the colonial government itself. 37 As Trocki notes, the local Singapore retail market itself had little impact on the larger trade in opium; he estimates that only 20 per cent of Indian production was landed at Singapore. Much of this was transshipped to other points like Java or further east to Hong Kong. 38 The Dutch colonial government bought opium either directly from the Calcutta auctions or indirectly through traders. Java's opium farmers would then buy their rations from warehouses in Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya (Rush Opium to Java). However, these farmers were forced to buy and sell at inflated prices, which reflected both official Dutch policy to limit opium consumption and Dutch reliance on opium revenues. A price advantage, therefore, could accrue to successful smugglers. 39 Rush Opium to Java attributes this calculation to Christian Casten, a Batavia official responsible for opium affairs.
applicable even to colonies where the price was nominally much higher. Historically, gyrations in the free-market price directly affected nominal government farm prices. Finally, opium price data are neither reliably or systematically available from Chinese sources.
Export commodity prices
The Straits Times is also the source of matching end-of-month commodity prices. We selected commodities that were produced (and often processed) locally for export: tin, gambier, tapioca, sago, black pepper, copra, and Liberian coffee. 
Share prices for publicly listed companies
Other data
End-of-month exchange rates for each country or territory, and the price of silver in London, 42 were also collected from the same newspapers or, in the case of silver, from The Times of London. Exchange rates are closing or midpoint quotes supplied to the newspapers by leading banks. We need exchange rates to translate all prices into a common currency, the British pound. returns to serve as our global stock index return series. We use the global index returns to attempt to control for "other factors" in our statistical analysis. If, for example, we are trying to explain ups and downs in the price of a tin mining stock with opium prices, the global index returns can be included in the test to control for "general" factors and thereby focus more precisely on the specific impact of opium.
Finally, we obtained annual data on several non-price series published in colonial government publications and other summaries. These include the annual government revenues of the Straits Settlements and other Malayan states, number of Chinese immigrants and emigrants for the Straits Settlements, and the output of export commodities. These data were drawn from the dividends is not likely to induce significant bias in our results. This would not be the case if we were studying long-term cumulative stock returns, the fit of asset pricing models, or other issues related to total equity return performance. 42 Hong Kong and China were on the silver standard during our period of study and the exchange values of their currencies were determined by the price of silver in London. 43 Straits Settlements Annual Departmental Reports and other government documents.
Methodology
Our testable hypotheses imply significant relationships between the variables we have collected data on. We assume a simple linear relationship and, therefore, use regression analysis to assess the significance of the relationship between two variables, X t and Y t , ln{Y t / Y t-1 } = α + β ln{X t / X t-1 } + ε t .
The function ln{⋅} takes the log of consecutive monthly values of Y and X respectively. This expresses changes in those variables as a growth rate that typically has good statistical properties.
The error terms, ε t , define the precision of the slope coefficient, β, and, therefore, indicate the statistical significance of the estimated relationship. The estimated sign and significance of the slope coefficient, β, tells us whether or not there is a linear relationship between the two variables. The estimated β also indicates the scale of the association between the two variables.
For example, a β of .8 suggests that a one per cent change in X is associated with a .8 per cent change in Y. The regression also yields an "r-squared" statistic, a measure of the degree of explanatory power of the regression. For example, an "r-squared" of .5 indicates that the behavior of X over time can explain fifty per cent of the behavior of Y.
Note that both Y and X are measured as changes over the same time period, from "t-1" to "t". Therefore, no causality is implied by which variable goes on the "right" side versus the "left" side of the regression. 45 The estimated equations can help us distinguish between the causality stories of H1 and H2 only when interpreted with the predictions in Table 1 . 45 We will conduct one test in which a "previous" value, ln{X t-2 /X t-1 }, appears on the right side and a "contemporaneous" value, ln{Y t-2 /Y t-1 }, appears on the left side. This specification does imply causality from X to Y across time.
For one test, we also estima te the "rank correlation" between two variables. The rank correlation measures the extent to which the highest value of X tends to occur at the same time as the highest value of Y, the lowest value of X tends to occur at the same time as the lowest value of Y, and so on. This is an alternative measure of whether or not two variables appear related to each other. It can be effective for some cases (such as our annual data on commodity output, government revenues, and immigration) where the quantity and quality of data is poor, or we are not confident about the nature of the statistical distribution of the errors, ε t , which relate the two variables.
Results
Prior to discussing our results, we present an overview of the driving factor behind this study, the monthly price of opium at Singapore. fluctuated between 400 and 1200 dollars per chest. There is an upward trend in prices and, as restriction of Indian opium exports loomed, the price in Singapore skyrocketed. the return on our global stock index. There is one regression estimate for each of the industry portfolios described by Table 2 , plus one regression for an equally weighted average of all stock returns from each of our four economies, British Malaya, Hong Kong, Netherlands Indies, and Shanghai.
Opium prices and stock returns
The table indicates only a few portfolios that exhibit a significant association with changes in the price of opium. British Malaya Banking and Insurance portfolio increases .65 per cent for every one per cent increase in the price of opium. As Table 2 indicates, this portfolio consists entirely of a single firm, Straits Insurance. During this period, local insurance companies were primarily concerned with shipping insurance. Therefore, the result suggests that the demand for shipping insurance and, implicitly, the amount of shipping activity were positively correlated with movements in the price of opium. This is consistent with either H1 or H2. The R 2 coefficient
indicates that the combined impact of opium and the global stock index explain about five per cent of the movements in the portfolio's value. British Malaya Ports also shows a statistically significant positive association with opium, although it is smaller and explains less than one per cent of the overall movements in stock returns for the portfolio. Again, this is evidence of higher profits from the shipping business at times of high opium prices, and is consistent with either H1 or Table 3 ) exhibits a very strongly significant positive regression relationship with opium price changes. A one per cent increase in the opium price is associated with a .17 per cent increase in Malayan stock prices generally, and opium explains about two per cent of all movements in those stock prices. This confirms that opium had a small but significant impact on the Malayan economy as measured through its stock market.
No reaction on the part of labour-intensive British Malayan Mining rejects both H1 and H2: there is no evidence that opium was a "cost of production" in these industries (H1) or that prosperity in these industries spurred demand for opium (H2). No reaction for British Malayan
Rubber is consistent with H1 and rejects H2. To the extent that Malaya as a whole may be thought of as an export commodity economy, the positive association between the index of all Malayan stocks and the price of opium reported in the previous paragraph could be thought of as supportive of H2. There are no reactions for stocks from the other colonies and territories. Table 4 presents regressions of commodity price changes on opium price changes and the Table 4 about here] return on our global stock index. There is one regression estimate for each of the commodities in the sample. Rubber is excluded as it was not traded regularly except at the end of our sample period. All of the commodities exhibit some relationship with the price of opium. About eight per cent of the variation in the price of tin can be explained by opium, with a one per cent increase in the price of opium associated with a .18 per cent increase in the price of tin. The importance of the general health of the world economy to the tin market is evident in the large slope coefficient on our world stock index return series. Prices for labour intensive gambier and copra also show a very significant association with opium prices, as indicated by the statistics in the table. Black pepper, tapioca, sago, and Liberian coffee also show significant or marginally significant associations with the price of opium.
Opium prices and export commodity prices
[Insert
Like the stock price results, these regressions confirm the small but significant impact of opium on the export-commodity sector of the Southeast Asian colonial economies, particularly for Malaya. It is especially significant that strong results are observed for tin and gambier since they are known to be labour-intensive and Chinese-dominated. However, the commodity results do not allow us to distinguish between H1 and H2. It may be the case that the positive associations between opium prices and commodity prices represent the higher cost of labour implied by higher opium prices (H1). The results are also consistent with a general business cycle effect in which commodity prices rise and fall with global demand, and opium prices reflect these trends like other consumer prices in an export-dependent economy (H2). Table 5 presents regressions of changes in annual government revenues, Chinese immigration, and commodity exports of the Straits Settlements on changes in the price of opium.
Commodity exports, government revenues, and migration
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Because the number of observations of data is low and the statistical properties of the series are not clear, we also present rank correlations that relate both levels and changes of these variables.
The data series span different time periods due to the varying availability of these series, but all series extend to the end of our sample period, June 1911.
Government revenues and expenses show no correlation with ups and downs in the price of opium. While this could indicate that opium was an extremely steady source of government revenue, it may also reflect changes in retail prices and license fees that helped smooth the opium revenue against fluctuations in the wholesale price of opium. The immigration numbers show no correlations with the opium price, but it may be the case that the number of data points is too small to support statistical inference. Some negative slope coefficients for commodity exports (tin, pepper) are supportive of H1. However, the non-parametric rank correlations reported in the right-hand column of the table indicate that the results on tin and gambier are not robust, which is unsurprising given the small number of observations for those series. The apparent negative correlation between rubber exports and opium price changes would reject both H1 and H2, but the number of observations of data available for analysis is too tiny to be taken seriously.
Leads and lags of opium versus other commodity prices.
Table 6 presents regression evidence on the extent to which export commodity prices followed (H1) or led (H2) opium prices. For each commodity in the sample, price changes on [Insert Table 6 about here] regressed on leading, lagging, and contemporaneous opium price changes. The slope coefficients on the contemporaneous opium price change are mostly significant, and mirror the results reported in Table 4 . However, there is very little evidence of any leading or lagging relationship between the commodity prices and the opium price. Three cells indicate significant or marginally significant leads or lags, but they are not strong, consistent in sign, or numerous. Therefore, these tests do not allow us to distinguish between H1 and H2.
Summary and Conclusions
We have used monthly prices from stock and commodity markets, along with other related annual data, to assess the importance of the opium trade to colonial Asian economies during the period from 1873 to the restriction of Indian opium exports to China in 1911. Opium prices explain a small but significant fraction of the stock price movements in selected trade-related industries. Most export commodity prices are also correlated with opium prices, particularly those for labour-intensive, Chinese-dominated products like tin and gambier. However, only a small fraction of the movements in the prices of these commo dities can be explained by opium.
There is no reliable evidence that opium price changes affected changes in annual government revenues, immigration, or quantities of commodities exported. Except for the evidence on rubber share prices, there is little evidence to support hypothesis H1 that proposes opium as a leading economic factor in these economies. It seems more likely that opium was a significant but small indicator of broader economic trends, perhaps consistent with a weak version of H2.
We recognize that several limitations constrain our ability to draw strong conclusions about opium's impact on the colonial economies. First, we cannot gauge how large and important the stock and commodity markets were, and how responsive prices were to economic developments and, in particular, to changes in the state of the opium business. If these markets were small in size or dominated by short-term speculators, they may not reflect fundamental information very precisely. Second, it is simplistic to assume that changes in the price of opium are sufficient to characterize the state of the opium business or the particular impact of opium on business costs and government revenues. A more complete array of information including retail prices, quantities imported and sold, and estimated prices and quantities sold in the black market might give us more definitive results. In particular, we do not know the quantity of opium purchased by "farmers" and government monopolies, the number of smokers, or the importance of "recycled" opium obtained from ashes or pipe scrapings. Third, more information on consumer prices, wages, and other everyday economic indicators could be used to study another facet of the impact of the opium trade. Fourth, we have included no information on monetary conditions and currency regime changes that may have had an influence on the opium trade or on the colonial economies generally. 46 Furthermore, the lack of data from prior to 1873 excludes the period when opium price fluctuations, links between commodity production and opium, and direct European participation in the opium trade were thought to be strongest. Finally, the lack of data on the rubber trade prevents us studying the rubber industry more extensively to distinguish between H1 and H2.
In spite of these potential shortcomings, we believe our results are interesting and offer new evidence on the importance of the opium trade to the colonial Asian economies. We also 46 See Warren Bailey and Kirida Bhaopichitr, "How Important was Silver? Some Evi dence on Exchange Rate Fluctuations and Stock Returns in Colonial-Era Asia" (unpublished Cornell University working paper, 2000) and references therein.
hope our work encourages others to address historical and political questions with financial market data. 
